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Patrick N. McDonald*

Equality Before the Law
and the Indian Act:
In Defence of the
Supreme Court

I. Introduction
The British North America Act' declares in section 91(24) that the
exclusive legislative authority of Parliament extends to "Indians,
2
and Lands reserved for the Indians". The CanadianBill of Rights
provides that no law of Canada shall be applied so as to abridge the
right of the individual to equality before the law without
discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or
sex. Three recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have
grappled with the reconciliation of constitutional authorization and
statutory proscription. The trilogy has evoked a virtually unprecedented volume of critical comment, the common feature of which
is the view that the first of the three cases has been overruled or
limited severely in application by the second, and the principle of
3
the second applied wrongly in the third.
*Patrick N. McDonald, Associate Professor of Law, University of Alberta
I am heavily indebted to Wilbur F. Bowker, Q.C., formerly Dean of the Faculty of
Law, University of Alberta, and now Director Emeritus of the Institute of Law
Research and Reform, who read and made extensive comments upon an earlier
draft of this paper and whose insight brought to light the instructive work of
American courts in the area of Indian legislation.
1. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (as amended) (U.K.); R.S.C. 1970, Append. II, No. 5
2. S.C. 1960, c. 44; R.S.C. 1970, Append. III
3. The three cases areR. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282; 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473; 71
W.W.R. 161; [1970] 3 C.C.C. 355; 10 C.R.N.S. 334, Attorney-General of
Canadav. Canard, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548; 4 N.R. 91; [1975] 3
W.W.R. 1,Attorney-Generalof Canadav. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349; 38 D.L.R.
(3d) 48 1. Chronologically, of course, Lavell is second and Canardthird, but I have
described them otherwise because the result in Canard was anticipated before
Lavell was decided and because the latter is a more extreme application of the
principle articulated in the former. Critical comment is to be found in R.W. Kerr,
The CanadianBill of Rights and Sex-Based Differentialsin CanadianFederalLaw
(1974), 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 357; P.W. Hogg, Comment (1974), 52 Can. B. Rev.
263; W.S. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court
Decisions in Lavell and Burnshine: A Retreatfrom Drybones to Dicey? (1975), 7
Ottawa L.R. 1; D.W. Elliott, Canard:A Triad Returns (1975), 25 U. Toronto L.J.
317; V.S. MacKinnon, Booze, Religion, Indians and the CanadianBill of Rights,
[1973) Pub. Law 295, where reference is made at 315 to the "persuasive logic" of
Laskin J's dissent in Lavell; D. Phillips, Indiansand Inequality:A Commentary on
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Following the same course as American jurisprudence under the
equal protection and due process clauses, the Supreme Court of
Canada has determined in substance that equality before the law
does not set an absolute standard. It does not require equal treatment
of dissimilar cases. To use Justice Frankfurter's language,
Parliament has been held competent to treat persons with precisely
"that separateness which their distinctive characteristics and
functions in society make appropriate". 4 What is a common
characteristic of the jurisprudence in the context of Indian
legislation, and not generally appreciated by its Canadian
detractors, is the nature of the role played by the constitution's
distribution of legislative authority in shaping this limit to the
egalitarian precept.
II.Canard
As part of a"comprehensive testamentary code in respect of
Indians", section 43 of the federal Indian Act 5 has the effect of
denying to an Indian spouse the right to administer the estate of his
or her deceased spouse. In Attorney-General of Canada v. Canard,
the Manitoba Court of Appeal found the provisions inoperative
under the CanadianBill of Rights as constituting a denial of a right
enjoyed by non-Indians and therefore a denial of equality before the
law by reason of race. 6 The point of the unanimous judgment was
that Parliament could not single out Indians for the purpose of
special provisions regarding administration of estates.
... In the present case we have a situation in which the
Parliament of Canada has said in effect 'because you are an
Indian you shall not administer the estate of your late husband'.
Parliament has thereby in a law of Canada placed a legal
that
road-block in the way of one particular racial group, placing
7
racial group in a position of inequality before the law.

Although Dickson J.A. (as he then was) said flatly that the Bill of
A.-g. Canada v. Canard(1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 368; I. F. Kelly, The Bill of
Rights, the Indian Act, and Equality Before the Law: the Need for, and the
Development of, a "Reasonableness" Test (1974), 2 Queen's L.J. 151; W.S.
Tarnopolsky, The Supreme Court and the CanadianBill of Rights (1975), 53 Can.
B. Rev. 649; B.J. McCourt, Comment (1974), 6 Ottawa L.R. 635
4. Quoted in J.Tussman and J.ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws
(1949), 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341 at 368
5. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6
6. (1973), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 9; [1972] 5 W.W.R. 678 (Man. C.A.)
7. Id. at 23; [ 197215 W.W.R. 678 at 691
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Rights proclaims an egalitarian doctrine, 8 he doubtless accepted that
the right to equality before the law does not involve the proposition
that all federal statutes must apply equally to all individuals. 9 It
seems clear, however, that for him no group or class to which
legislation is applied specially may be distinguished by race. He
would not entertain the suggestion that Indians have throughout
been in a state of dependency and pupillage, for under the Bill of
Rights, he said, "no racial group shall be deemed inferior to any
other racial group". 1 0
But the very presence in the BNA Act of section 91(24) shows that
Indians and their lands, as objects of legislative action, are
possessed of distinctive characteristics. True, the enumeration does
not suggest inferiority, but it suggests difference. Rand J. has
expressed the point this way:
• .. The language of [the Indian Act] embodies the accepted
view that these aborigines are, in effect, wards of the State,
whose care and welfare are a political trust of the highest
obligation."
The position under the American Constitution is similar. In the
leading case of United States v. Sandoval,-2 the Supreme Court
said:
• ..Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress

to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but long continued
legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of
judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a
superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising
a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders ....
The Indian classification then is quite unlike other racial
classifications, which are usually "perceived as a stigma of
inferiority and a badge of opprobrium". 13 The Indian classification,
8. Id. at 20; [ 1972] 5 W.W.R. at 688
9. Tarnopolsky suggests that Dickson J.A. in fact applied the principle he
(Tarnopolsky) calls "reasonable justifiability". The CanadianBill of Rights (2d,
revised ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1975) at 308
10. (1973), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 9 at21; [197215 W.W.R. 678 at689
11. St. Ann's Island Shooting and Fishing Club Ltd. v. The King, [1950] S.C.R.
211 at 219; [1950] 2 D.L.R. 225 at 232, quoted in the Lavell case by Ritchie J. See
(19741 S.C.R. 1349 at 1360; 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 at 491. See also cases cited in L.
C. Green, North America's Indians and the Trusteeship Concept (1975), 4
Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 137, especially at 147
12. (1913), 231 U.S. 28 at 45-46
13. Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection (1968-69), 82 Harv. L.
Rev. 1065 at 1127
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if adopted by legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian power, is an
expression of special regard.
It is not possible simply to ignore the distinctiveness attributed to
Indians by the constitution, because the Bill ofRights question is not
reached until the court has determined that the legislation represents
an exercise of Parliament's exclusive authority under section
91(24). That determination makes it equally difficult to find under
the Bill of Rights that the particular kind of legislative treatment is
not made appropriate by the distinctive characteristics recognized
constitutionally. This Dickson J.A. would appear to have done for
he does concede that the latter part of section 91(24), "Lands
reserved for the Indians", would support special legislative
restrictions on the right of Indians to alienate lands. In my view,
there is necessarily involved in a determination of validity under
section 91(24), the conclusion that the legislative treatment is
appropriate to the distinctive characteristics underlying the special
Indian power. This is so because, constitutionally, it is not enough
that the legislation prescribes a rule applicable only to Indians. In Re
Insurance Act of Canada14 , the Privy Council struck down
provisions of the InsuranceAct of Canada which required aliens to
obtain a federal licence on the basis that this was not alien

legislation in the true sense of the word. The provisions did not
"deal with the position of an alien as such" [emphasis added]. 15
Similarly, provincial legislation which denied the franchise to
Chinese, Japanese and Indians was upheld in Cunningham v. Tomey
Homma 16 on the basis of a distinction drawn between what is
necessarily involved in a particular status and its incidental
consequences. The point of these cases is that legislation will be
held an exercise of power described in terms of a particular class of
persons only if it is related to the peculiar attributes of that class;
section 91(24) "confers legislative authority over the Indians qual
Indians and not otherwise". 17
14. [1932]A.C. 41; [1932] 1 D.L.R. 96 (P.C.) (Que.)
15. Id. at51; [1932] 1D.L.R. at 105
16. [1903]A.C. 151 (P.C.)(B.C.)
17. R. v. Drybones, [19701 S.C.R. 282 at 303; 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473 at 489; 71
W.W.R. 161 at 178; [1970] 3 C.C.C. 355 at 370; 10 C.R.N.S. 334 at 352 (per
Pigeon J.). See K. Lysyk, The Unique ConstitutionalPosition of the Canadian
hdian (1967), 45 Can. B. Rev. 513 at 533-34: "'The sole fact that a statute is one
of special application made applicable only to a class or classes of federal 'persons'
does not in itself warrant the conclusion that it lies within federal competence."
See also Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare (1976), 60 D.L.R.
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Not surprisingly, there is much in the judgment of Dickson J.A.
to suggest that he doubted any reasonable connection between
section 91(24) and the administration of estates. He said of Mrs.
Canard that section 43 "denies her a civil right", suggesting that
section 43 is a property and civil rights law and not an aboriginal
law.' 8 He would not accept any argument that equates
Indians with children and mental defectives, meaning that Indians do
not possess those characteristics which make appropriate a law
limiting their freedom of disposition. 19 He noted that control of
testamentary capacity is not a necessary incident to the control of
Indian reserve lands. 20 These were considerations which Dickson
J.A. might have used to support the conclusion that section 43 is not
supportable under section 91(24) of the BNA Act. But feeling
himself bound by precedent to find otherwise, Dickson J.A. could
not use those same considerations to deny in effect any reasonable
connection between the distinctive characteristics and the special
treatment. The reasonable connection was established by the
constitutional determination.
The error in the Manitoba Court of Appeal was corrected by the
Supreme Court of Canada. Noting benevolently that the judgments
(3d) 148 at 154; 6 N.R. 491 at 498 (S.C.C.), where Laskin C.J.C. says that the
exclusive power of Parliament under section 91(24) does not extend to all
legislation which applies to Indians, but only to legislation which touches their
"Indianness". The consequences of a failure to see that the power under section
91(24) is so limited are considerable. In his ProgressReport on the CanadianBill
of Rights (1976), 3 Dalhousie L.J. 39, Professor Lyon notes the decision of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal inReAdoptionAct (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 718;
[1974] 3 W.W.R. 363 (sub nom. Re Birth RegistrationNo. 67-09-022272) to the
effect that an Indian law means any law enacted by Parliament that applies to
Indians only. It was this aspect of the decision with which the majority inNatural
Parents disagreed. Because he is prepared to accept the position of the Court of
Appeal, Professor Lyon does not see that the question whether differential
treatment of Indians is based on "some rational legislative objective and is justified
by differing circumstances" (at 60), is a question that is answered by the
constitutional determination. He suggests that the narrow definition of equality
before the law is the result of "the inhibitions caused by a constitution that calls for
separate treatment of Indians" (at 64), when in truth the constitutional mandate is
made compatible with a definition of equality that Lyon himself advocates, namely
one based on justified differential treatment. Finally, Professor Lyon does not stop
to consider whether Drybones might be exceptional as not involving "Indian"
legislation, and concludes that the whole Indian Act is contrary to the Bill of Rights
unless "equality before the law" is narrowed to "the Dicean form seen in Lavell"
(at 57).
18. (1973), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 9 at 20; [1972] 5 W.W.R. 678 at 688
19. Id. at21; [1972]5 W.W.R. at 689
20. Id. at 22; [1972] 5 W.W.R. at 690
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of the Supreme Court in Attorney-General of Canada v. Lavell and
in R. v. Burnshine2 ' came after the decision of the Manitoba Court
in the instant case, Martland J. pointed out that the Bill of Rights
does not preclude federal legislation which applies to a particular
group or class of persons. 2 2 If it must be shown that the legislative
class is rationally distinctive and not selected arbitrarily, 2 3 how,
asked Ritchie J. can the court ignore the special status so clearly
attributed to Indians by the British North America Act? As the Bill
of Rights states that it reflects the respect of Parliament for its
constitutional authority, surely the Bill is not to be applied in
disregard of the special legislative classes recognized in the
constitution. 24 Nor does the relevance of the constitution stop with
its recognition of a group appropriate for special treatment. If
section 43 is valid under the Indian power, the constitution has
recognized Indians as distinctive for the very purpose of
testamentary legislation. In pointing out that section 43 is an
exercise of Parliament's exclusive legislative authority under
section 91(24), and that the testamentary rights of non-Indians are
beyond federal jurisdiction, Martland and Ritchie JJ. recognize the
constitutional line drawn between the estate assets of Indians and
the estate assets of others. Being valid legislation under section
91(24), the provision found inoperative by the Court of Appeal
treats Indians with exactly that separateness which the constitution
recognizes as appropriate to their distinctive place in the
community.
21. R. v. Burnshine, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 693; 44 D.L.R. (3d) 584; 2N.R. 53; [1974]
4 W.W.R. 49; 15 C.C.C. (2d) 505; 25 C.R.N.S. 270. This case involved not
the Indian Act but section 150 of the Prisonsand ReformatoriesAct, R.S.C. 1970
c. P-21, which authorized special punishment for young offenders in British
Columbia.
22. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 at 188-89; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548 at 561; 4 N.R. 91 at
122-23; [197513 W.W.R. I at 14
23. In Burnshine, Martland J. liked Jackett C.J,'s description of a "law that, for
sound reasons of legislative policy, applies to one class of persons and not to
another class" ([1975] 1 S.C.R. 693 at 701; 44 D.L.R. (3d) 584 at 589; 2 N.R. 53
at 60; [1974] 4 W.W.R. 49 at 55; 15 C.C.C. (2d) 505 at 510; 25 C.R.N.S. 270 at
276, quoting from Re Prata and Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1972]
F.C. 1405 at 1414; 31 D.L.R. (3d) 465 at 473). On appeal in the latter case, sub
nom. Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1976] 1 S.C. R. 376 at
382; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 383 at 387, Martland J. said that "[1]egislation dealing with a
particular class of people is valid if it is enacted for the purpose of achieving a valid
federal objective".
24. This is "class consciousness" of a different sort from that described by
Professor A.S. Abel, The Neglected Logic of9J and 92 (1969), 19 U. Toronto L.J.
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Precisely the point being made here has formed the basis for the
acceptance by the United States Supreme Court of federal
legislative provisions applicable only to Indians. Although the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to
the federal government, it has been decided that, if a classification
in federal legislation would be invalid under that clause as
discriminatory, it is inconsistent with the due process requirement
of the Fifth Amendment, which does apply to Congress. 25 The
Court spoke as follows in Morton v. Mancari:
On numerous occasions this Court specifically has upheld
legislation that singles out Indians for particular and special
treatment .

.

. As long as the special treatment can be tied

rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation
toward the26 Indians, such legislative judgments will not be
disturbed.
The unique constitutional obligation furnishes a rational basis for
the discrimination. 27 Notice was taken by W. F. Bowker, in his
comment upon Drybones, that the United States Supreme Court has
refrained from striking down Acts of Congress dealing specifically
with Indians because Indians are in a state of pupillage or
wardship. 28 This supported his suggestion that protective legislation
is not discriminatory. My point here is different only in emphasis.
Legislation protective of Indians survives challenge in the United
States not because it is benign, but because, being benign, it is an
exercise of the federal Indian power. I emphasize that it is the
existence of that power which stamps protective legislation as in
pursuance of a valid federal objective.
In a word, section 43 was upheld because it did not deny equality
before the law, in the sense of treating differently persons similarly
situated, and not because section 91(24) will sustain legislation that
487. Beetz J. said ([1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 at 207; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548 at 575; 4 N.R.
91 at 106-07; [197513 W.W.R. I at 29-30):
The British North America Act, 1867, under the authority of which the
CanadianBill of Rights was enacted, by using the word 'Indians' in s. 91(24),
creates a racial classification and refers to a racial group for whom it
contemplates the possibility of a special treatment.
25. See e.g. United States v. Antelope (1975), 523 F. 2d 400 (U.S. C.A., 9th
Circ.)
26. (1974), 417 U.S. 535at554-55
27. See e.g. United States v. Analla (1974), 490 F. 2d 1204 (U.S. C.A., 10th
Circ.)
28. Comment (1970), 8 Alberta L. Rev. 409
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denies equality. This is the first step towards a proper understanding
of the cases under discussion.
Writing in 1971, Professor Tarnopolsky predicted the Supreme
Court result in Canardon the ground that the Bill of Rights "cannot
apply to an inequality which arises because of the operation of a
federal law and a provincial law" .29 Similarly, Professor Hogg has
expressed the view that the decision of the Manitoba Court of
Appeal is wrong in that it ignored the federal character of Canada by
finding inequality in the rules of the Indian Act because harsher than
the provincial rules. 30 In the same vein, Professor Elliott sees as the
only essential difficulty with federal-provincial comparison "the
practical difficulty that provincial statutes will inevitably differ from
comparable federal legislation, and from each other" .31 The first
writer bases his view on the narrow premise that "the law" before
which one is entitled to equality is law within the jurisdiction of
Parliament, and the second on the somewhat broader notion that
legislative diversity is the essence of federalism. Both would, I
think, see their views as in harmony with the American principle
that "equal protection of the law" applies only to equal protection
before the laws of the same sovereign body. 32 Professor Elliott sees
his practical difficulty overcome when a body of common rules has
emerged from among provincial statutes. 3 3 Although I agree with
Hogg and Tarnopolsky that Canard was decided correctly, I think
34
that all three have missed the essential point of the case.
If these writers recognize that the state of provincial law must be
irrelevant, they fail to see that it is the fact of provincialjurisdiction
as the badge of a different legislative class which denies the
inequality. What the Bill of Rights does not require is equal
treatment of dissimilar cases; what Canard excludes from its
operation is not equal treatment by different legislative bodies of
29. The Canadian Bill ofRightsfromn Diefenbakerto Drybones (1971), 17 McGill
L.J. 437 at 456
30. Supra, note 3 at 267-68
31. Supra, note 3 at 326
32. See P. Cavalluzzo, JudicialReview and the Bill of Rights: Drybones and its
Aftermath (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall U. 511 at 534
33. Supra, note 3 at 326
34. Interestingly, Laskin C.J.C. has the same understanding of the majority result
in Canard for he said, in dissenting, that it treats the "mere grant of legislative
power as itself authorizing Parliament to offend against its generally stated
protections in the CanadianBill of Rights" [emphasis added] ([1976] 1 S.C.R. 170
at 184; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548 at 557; 4 N.R. 91 at 131; [1971]3 W.W.R. I at 10).
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similar cases. The testamentary rights of Indians and others are
constitutionally, and therefore rationally dissimilar.
Although Professor Hogg seems closer to the point than does
Professor Tarnopolsky, it is clear that he too is wide of the mark. He
suggests that inequalities between the laws of different legislative
bodies should be "deemed" not to be inconsistent with equality
before the law, and later that, where a law employs a classification
used by the constitution to confer jurisdiction, it does not have to
meet the test of equality. 3 5 Significant also is Professor Hogg's
footnote answer to a suggestion made by Leslie Katz, who agrees
with Tarnopolsky and Hogg in rejecting a comparison of federal and
provincial laws in equality cases, and also with them in failing to
see the fundamental reason for doing S0.36 Where, as in Canard,
Parliament has no power to enact similar federal laws for
non-Indians, Katz suggests that the Indian Act provision be
compared with the laws of the federal territories on the matter. 37 To
this, Hogg responds that the absence of a similar provision
respecting non-Indians would be attributable not to Parliament but
to the local Territorial Council, with whose decisions Parliament is
politically unable to interfere. 38 In other words, it would be
"unrealistic", albeit legally proper, to regard the territorial laws as
laws enacted by Parliament. The answer ought to have been that, in
comparing Indian legislation with such territorial ordinances as
"only the provinces could have enacted in respect of persons or
"unrealistic", albeit legally proper, to regard the territorial laws as
laws enacted by Parliament. The answer ought to have been that, in
comparing Indian legislation with such territorial ordinances as
"only the provinces could have enacted in respect of persons or
lands in the provinces", 3 9 one is comparing legislation on
constitutionally distinct matters, and Canardapplies. 40 Whether the
35. Professor Hogg of course recognizes that this last proposition is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court decision in Drybones. He concludes that Drybones was
wrongly decided (supra, note 3 at 268). It is hoped that analysis later in this paper
will show that a proper understanding of Canardcasts no doubt upon the validity of
that landmark case.
36. L. Katz, The Indian Act and Equality Before the Law (1973), 6 Ottawa L. R.
277
37. Id. at 281-82
38. Legally, the Territorial Council legislates at the sufferance of Parliament.
North British CanadianInvestment Co. v. St. JohnSchool DistrictTrustees (1904),
35 S.C.R. 461
39. Supra, note 36 at 278
40. For reasons that will appear, this statement does not involve a rejection of
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legislative body responsible for the other law is Parliament or a
territorial legislature is quite beside the point.
While Hogg and Tarnopolsky reject, for the wrong reasons, a
comparison of federal and provincial laws, Phillips suggests that a
"reasonable discrimination qualification" of the type employed in
Burnshine should be applied where the comparison is made, 4 1 and
Elliott suggests that the majority decision in Canard does not
support the "valid federal objective" approach taken in
Burnshine.4 2 They do not see reflected in the very need to compare
federal with provincial law a rational basis for discrimination. There
is no inconsistency whatever in Ritchie J.'s Canard judgment and
his concurrence in the majority Burnshine decision.
III. Drybones
If Canard is understood to mean that the Bill of Rights will not
permit a comparison to be made between federal and provincial law,
so that a law which employs a classification used by the constitution
to confer jurisdiction does not have to meet the test of equality, it
will be concluded that R. v. Drybones was wrongly decided, 43 or, at
best, that it is limited in application to the operation of the Indian
44
Act in the Northwest Territories.
It is surprising to see Drybones set beside Canard in this way,
because the critical fact about the first case is that it was there
unnecessary to make the finding that was, in my view, essential to
the result in the second. Arising as the case did in the Northwest
Territories, it was not necessary to test section 94(b) of the Indian
Act, making it an offence for an Indian to be intoxicated off a
reserve, against the limitations upon federal authority deriving from
the distribution of powers. The question whether section 94(b) is
valid Indian legislation under section 91(24) of the BNA Act did not
have to be considered. 4 5 Beyond that, Drybones tends to affirm
Drybones. This is not Tarnopolsky's answer either. TarnopoIsky, supra, note 3, 7
Ottawa L.R. at 21
41. Supra, note 3 at 375, 376, 379
42. Supra, note 3 at 321
43. Hogg, supra, note 3 at 268
44. Id. at 268 n. 23; Tarnopolsky, supra, note 29 at 456
45. The authority of Parliament in the Northwest Territories "to legislate for the
future welfare and good government of the said territory" (Order of Her Majesty in
Council Admitting Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory Into the Union,

June 23rd, 1870) represents precisely the aggregate of federal and provincial
jurisdiction within a province.

736 The Dalhousie Law Journal

what has been said above, because section 94(b) was found in
conflict with the Bill of Rights for the very reasons which would
undermine its constitutional validity under the Indian power.
It is reasonable to conclude from Drybones that the Supreme
Court did not regard section 94(b) as valid Indian legislation. As
argued earlier, the fact of the legislation's limited application to
Indians is not a sufficient condition of validity. As Professor
Sanders says, the activity proscribed "must have some connection
with the fact that the person is an Indian". 46 Ritchie J. held that "an
individual is denied equality before the law if it is made an offence
punishable at law, on account of his race, for him to do something
which his fellow Canadians are free to do".

47

In saying this, he was

not bothered by the dissenting opinion of Pigeon J. expressing a
point of view which he (Ritchie J.) later adopted in Lavell 48 and
Canard.49 Pigeon J. said in dissent that the Bill ofRights should not
be interpreted to preclude special class legislation enacted pursuant
to section 91(24) of the BNA Act. Section 94(b), then, was not
considered to be of this type. 50 The distinction is expressed by
Ritchie J. himself in Lavell:
. . [T]here
[
is a wide difference between legislation such as s.
12(1) (b) [which denies Indian status to women who marry
non-Indians] governing the civil rights of designated persons
living on Indian Reserves to the use and benefit of Crown lands,
and criminal legislation such as s.95 [formerly 94(b)] which
creates an offence punishable at law for Indians to act in a certain
fashion when off a Reserve. The former legislation is enacted as
part of the plan devised by Parliament, under s. 91(24) for the
regulation of the internal domestic life of Indians on Reserves.
The latter is criminal legislation exclusively concerned with
behaviour of Indians off a reserve.51
46. D.E. Sanders, The Indian Act and the Bill of Rights (1973-74), 6 Ottawa L.R.
397 at 412
47. [1970] S.C.R. 282 at 297; 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473 at 484; 71 W.W.R. 161 at 173;
[1970]3 C.C.C. 355 at 365-66; I0 C.R.N.S. 334 at 347
48. [1974] S.C.R. 1349 at 1361; 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 at491
49. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 at 192; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548 at 563; 4 N.R. 91 at 119;
[197513 W.W.R. I at 16
50. [1970] S.C.R. 282 at 304; 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473 at 489; 71 W.W.R. 161 at 179;
[1970] 3 C.C.C. 355 at 370 - 71; 10 C.R.N.S. 334 at 353. This explains why
Ritchie J., according to Professor Hogg, supra, note 3 at 269, "did not attempt to
answer" the proposition that the very object of section 91(24) is to enable the
Parliament of Canada to make legislation applicable only to Indians as such and
therefore not applicable to Canadian citizens generally. The key words here are "as
such".

51. [1974] S.C.R. 1349 at 1370; 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 at 498. Ritchie J. has been
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Sanders has observed that there was no argument in Drybones
suggesting some fundamental difference between Indians and
non-Indians that justified a continuing discrimination in relation to
alcohol, and that there was accordingly no attempt to justify section
94(b) on the basis of an American style doctrine of reasonable
classification. 52 Given the parameters of the reasonable classification doctrine as applied to Indian legislation, this is tantamount to an
observation that the lack of support for section 94(b) under the
Indian power was conceded. Sanders recognizes later in the same
article that in describing section 94(b) as criminal legislation,
Ritchie J. was saying, in Lavell, that "it was not legislation
justified, constitutionally, as flowing from section 91(24) of the
British North America Act". 53 It is now apparent why Ritchie J., in
deciding Drybones, did so in terms which emphasized the penal
nature of section 94(b). 54 Laskin C.J.C. did not perceive that
Drybones was distinguishable as not involving Indian legislation; as
a consequence, he was compelled to dissent in Canard.
Notwithstanding the arguments of those who hold a contrary
view, 5 5 it is my opinion that, in Drybones, the Supreme Court
denied the power of Parliament under section 91(24) to enact
6
legislation dealing with the public drunkenness of Indians. 5
taken to task for reading section 91(24) as if it said "Indians on lands reserved for
the Indians". See Tarnopolsky, supra, note 3, 7 Ottawa L.R. at 8; Hogg, supra,
note 3 at 269-71. Whether or not the criticism is apt, this preoccupation tends to
obscure the vital point that Ritchie J. did not regard the Drybones provision as valid
Indian legislation. Beetz J. in Canard cast doubt on the validity of section 94(b)
under the Indian power without distinguishing between conduct on and off a
reserve ([1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 at 208-09; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548 at 577; 4 N.R. 91 at
108; [1975]3 W.W.R. I at 31).
52. Supra, note 46 at 402
53. Id. at411
54. Tarnopolsky, supra, note 3, 7 Ottawa L.R. at 10, dismisses out of hand the
suggestion that the basis of the authority for the liquor provisions in the Indian Act
is section 91(27) and not section 91(24) of the BNA Act. As a result, he has great
difficulty in reconciling the trilogy of cases. If Ritchie J. is understood to be
drawing a distinction between criminal sanctions and civil disabilities, and nothing
more, his reasoning appears unsupportable. That is how Laskin J. (as he then was)
and Abbott J. understood him. See [1974] S.C.R. 1349 at 1382-83 and 1374; 38
D.L.R. (3d) 481 at 507 and 484
55. D. E. Sanders, The Bill of Rights andIndianStatus (1972), 7 U.B.C.L. Rev.
81 at 97; Hogg, supra, note 3 at 272; Tamopolsky, supra, note 3, 7 Ottawa L.R. at
10
56. And incidentally, overruled the line of cases suggesting the contrary. See cases
cited in Sanders, id. at 97 n. 67. It is interesting that some commentators recognize,
first, how difficult it is to reconcile Canard and Drybones if the former denies that
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It is interesting to observe that section 94(b) of the Indian Act
may well have lost its character as Indian legislation upon the
coming into force on July 1, 1960 of amendments to the Act by
which the prohibition in section 94(a) against Indians being in
possession of intoxicants off a reserve was made conditional upon
the absence of a proclamation of exception. Before then, it was
possible to say of section 94 that it was motivated by a concern for
the welfare of Indians. As Pool P.M. stated in R. v. Gonzales:
... [T]hese prohibitions, contained in the Indian Act were,
unquestionably, instituted, at least in part, to prevent the Indian
from being cheated of his property57 in the course of barter for
liquor or subsequently while drunk.
The new policy introduced in 1960 was designed to allow Indians
off a reserve to purchase and consume liquor freely in accordance
with provincial law. It is simply inconceivable that Parliament could
continue to have the welfare of Indians in mind in applying to them
a special penalty for intoxication while making the intoxicants
freely available to them. All of the foregoing was the basis for the
decision of McFadden D.C.J. in Richards v. Cote5 8 which held
section 94(b) inoperative in the Province of Saskatchewan. If valid
at all in the provinces, 59 the legislation is an exercise either of the
federal general power or of the power to enact criminal law under
section 91(27).60
inequality is created by laws enacted pursuant to section 91(24), and second, that
there is no logical or justifiable reason why Indians off a reserve should be subject
to special penal provisions, but they do not draw the obvious conclusion that
section 94(b) is not Indian legislation. See Kelly, supra, note 3 at 17 1, 177
57. (1961), 34 W.W.R. 622 at 624; 130 C.C.C. 206 at 208; 35 C.R. 155 at 157
(B.C. Mag. Ct.), affd (1961), 35 W.W.R. 703 (sub nom. Re Indian Act); 130
C.C.C. 400; 35 C.R. 320 (B.C.S.C.), affd (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 290; 37
W.W.R. 257 (sub nom. Re IndianAct); 132 C.C.C. 237; 37 C.R. 56 (B.C.C.A.)
58. (1962),40 W.W.R. 340; 39 C.R. 204 (Sask. D.C.)
59. There is the suggestion inR. v. Whiteman (No. 2) (1971), 13 C.R.N.S. 356 at
358 (Sask. D.C.), that intoxication in public places is a matter of property and civil
rights under section 92(13).
60. Ritchie J. seems to favour the latter, as does Beetz J., who offered this as one
explanation ofDrybones:
. . [T]he
[
attaching of a particular consequence to Indian status would not be
characterized as a provision in pith and substance relating to Indians and lands
reserved for the Indians but as the use of other federal powers such as the power
to enact penal laws for the promotion of temperance and the prevention of
drunkenness. ...
([ 1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 at 208; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548 at 577; 4 N.R. 91 at 108; [ 1975] 3
W.W.R. I at 31). Katz suggests that Parliament's paramount legislative power in

Equality Before the Law and the Indian Act 739

This conclusion is consistent with the disposition by American
courts of cases involving legislation which treats Indians more
harshly than non-Indians. In United States v. Antelope 61 and United
States v. Big Crow, 62 United States Courts of Appeals struck down
as violative of due process provisions of the federal Major Crimes
Act 63 which had the effect, respectively, of dispensing with proof of
premeditation and deliberation where an Indian is charged with
killing a non-Indian on a reservation and of subjecting Indians to a
sentence ten times greater than that of non-Indians for assault and
burglary on a reservation. In each case, it was held that the
discriminatory treatment could not be justified under the wardship
concept of the federal Indian power. This led directly to the
conclusion that the provisions denied equal protection and
consequently violated the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The Courts did not strike down the legislation on the
basis of the distribution of powers because Article IV, section 3 and
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution give Congress full authority,
quite independently of the Indian power, to punish all crimes
committed on Indian reservations.64
It is evident that on any understanding of the Canarddecision,
there is nothing to contradict it in Drybones. It may be said of the
former that Parliament had not limited the testamentary rights of
non-Indians because it could not, and the equality guarantee was
qualified to accommodate "the federal principle of diversity
between legislative jurisdictions". 65 However, we now know that
nothing in the distribution of powers requires Parliament to limit to
Indians legislation directed against intoxication, for that is a matter
with which Parliament may deal, if at all, under powers embracing
Indians and non-Indians alike. If the Canardprinciple is understood
to excuse the use of a racial classification only when it is essential to
the validity of laws under the BNA Act, 66 then it has no application
to criminal legislation in which use of the classification is
constitutionally gratuitous. It is further apparent that Drybones
respect of temperance, arising under the general power, is involved. Supra, note 36
at 280
61. (1975), 523 F. 2d400 (U.S.C.A., 9th Circ.)
62. (1975), 523 F. 2d 955 (U.S.C.A., 8th Circ.)
63. 18U.S.C.#1153
64. C.J. Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law (Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers
Co-operative Pub. Co., 1969) at 408-09
65. Hogg, supra, note 3 at 268
66. Id.
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would be applicable to the operation of section 94(b) of the Indian
Act in any of the provinces of Canada, for the inequality was
manifest as much in the discriminatory operation of law within
federal jurisdiction as in the operation of federal law and law within
provincial jurisdiction. It is significant that Ritchie J. said nothing
limiting the applicability of his decision to the Northwest
Territories, and decided the case in terms which provide no support
for so limiting it. 67 Incidentally, then, R v. Whiteman (No. 2)68 and
Richards v. Cote6 9 would appear to have been decided correctly to
the extent that they found section 94(b) to be inoperative in the
Province of Saskatchewan. 70 Where, as in Drybones, Parliament
has limited to Indians the application of legislation upon a matter in
respect of which Indians and non-Indians alike fall within federal
jurisdiction, it is the absence of similar legislation for non-Indians
which proves the inequality. 71
There is error, however, in this analysis. As it would have it,
there is nothing of real consequence in the finding that section 94(b)
of the Indian Act is not Indian legislation; the important conclusion
67. On a related matter, Tamopolsky, supra, note 29 at 457, would limit the
application of Drybones to an inequality which arises by operation of "two or
more" provisions in federal statutes. Again, this is not supported by the ratio of the
case, in the expression of which reference is made to the contrast between
prohibition and impunity. Laskin C.J.C. agrees that the Drybones case would not
have been decided differently if section 94(b) of the Indian Act stood alone
(Attorney-Generalof Canada v. Canard, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 at 183; 52 D.L.R.
(3d) 548 at 557; 4 N.R. 91 at 130; [1975] 3 W.W.R. I at 9) and Ritchie J. himself
later lends support to that interpretation when in the same case (id. at 192; 52
D.L.R. (3d) at 564; 4 N.R. at 119; [1975] 3 W.W.R. at 16) he said that Indians
may be denied equality before the law in provisions of the Indian Act "standing
alone". As Laskin C.J.C. points out in Canard(id. at 178; 52 D.L.R. (3d) at 553;
4 N.R. at 125; [1975] 3 W.W.R. at 5) the American Bill of Rights hasnever been
limited in application to a discordance between statutory provisions. It is one of the
more unfortunate conclusions drawn by Elliott from Canard that, because it does
not permit a comparison to be made of federal and provincial law, "the
discrimination prohibited by the Bill of Rights [can] derive only for inequality
between two provisions of a federal statute, or from inequality between different
federal statutes". Supra, note 3 at 325
68. (1971), 13 C.R.N.S. 356 (Sask. D.C.)
69. (1962), 40 W.W.R. 340; 39 C.R. 204 (Sask. D.C.)
70. As explained later, it does not follow that the apparently inconsistent ruling in
R. v. Whiteman (No. 1), [1971] 2 W.W.R. 316; 13 C.R.N.S. 178 (Sask. D.C.),
was wrong. Tarnopolsky finds the cases irreconcilable, supra, note 9 at 305, and
Katz suggests thatNo. 1 was decided wrongly. Supra, note 36 at 280-81
71. Here, Katz agrees. Supra, note 36 at 280. In rejecting this approach as
unrealistic, Hogg, supra, note 3 at 268 n.22, does not see that it is the very point of
Drybones.
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is that, with respect to intoxication, federal jurisdiction includes
Indians and others. To reconcile Canard and Drybones, it appears
necessary only to find that the right or freedom restricted is one that
Parliament may control generally. On this basis, it is possible to
persist in the view that the Canard principle is one only of
exception, a reluctant avowal of the division of power between
legislative bodies, and to say of Drybones that the principle does not
apply where the restricted application of an enactment to Indians
72
does not exhaust federal power on the matter in question.
Drybones, it may be insisted, would not have been decided
differently had section 94(b) been Indian legislation.
But all of this takes Drybones too far, and it will not
accommodate Lavell. It leaps over the determination that section
94(b) is not Indian legislation, as preliminary only to a conclusion
of some consequence. In truth, the critical feature of the decision is
the conclusion respecting section 91(24) of the BNA Act, and not
that federal jurisdiction includes Indians and others. Remember that
Ritchie J. was later to affirm the logic of the dissenting opinion of
Pigeon J. who said in Drybones that section 91(24) authorizes
special class legislation; 7 3 if Ritchie J. agreed, he must have
decided differently if he thought section 94(b) was of that type.
When it came time to explain his earlier decision, Ritchie J. said
that section 94(b) was not Indian legislation; 74 his point was not that
Parliament may control the drunkenness of anyone but the
testamentary rights only of Indians. Finally, there is the telling
comment of Martland J. in Canard, that this was a case of Indian
legislation and not one "in which federal legislation dealing with a
subject matter within s. 91 of the British North America Act has
permitted certain acts or conduct by non-Indians and prohibited
75
Indians from doing the same thing".
72. This is the point at which I again part company with Katz. Because he would
interpret the Canard principle to allow a comparison of federal law and territorial
law within provincial jurisdiction, he is prepared to compare Indian legislation and
legislation (or the absence of legislation) under other federal powers. Supra, note
36 at 278 and 280-81
73. [1970] S.C.R. 282 at 304; 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473 at 489; 71 W.W.R. 161 at 179;
[197013 C.C.C. 355 at 370-71; 10 C.R.N.S. 334 at 353
74. Attorney-General of Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349 at 1372; 38
D.L.R. (3d) 481 at 498
75. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 at 189; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548 at 561; 4 N.R. 91 at 123;
[1975] 3 W.W.R. I at 14. An example of which is furnished in Laskin C.J.C.'s
dissenting judgment (id. at 179; 52 D.L.R. (3d) at 553; 4 N.R. at 125; [1975] 3
W.W.R. at 5) as to which, see infra at 744
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What does it mean to suggest that Drybones would have been
decided differently had section 94(b) been found valid under the
Indian power? It means that it is the characterization of legislation
for constitutional purposes as appropriate to the distinctive
characteristics of a federal class of persons that denies inequality in
a law of limited application, and it is not the need to accommodate
"diversity between legislative jurisdictions". 76 It proves the point
made earlier about Canard.To sustain a law under section 91(24) is
to find that it treats Indians with precisely that discrimination which
their unique constitutional status makes appropriate, and thereby to
defeat a Bill of Rights attack. In the result, what distinguishes
Canard and Drybones, or makes them consistent, is nothing more
or less than the disparity in conclusions respecting support for the
enactments under the Indian power.
Although McFadden D.C.J. did not say so in so many words, his
judgment in Richards v. Cote7 7 represents an application of the
point being made here. Before July 1, 1960, section 94(b) could not
have been inoperative under the CanadianBill ofRights, had it then
been in force, because the subsection was part of a larger scheme
conceived for the protection of Indians and hence valid under
section 91(24). However, after the date, it became an anachronism,
nothing more than a special penalty without any benign foundation,
and as a result it was no longer valid under section 91(24) and
inoperative for denying equality before the law.
What then of a law which, like the enactment in Canard, is
constitutionally valid under section 91(24), but, like that in
Drybones, one which Parliament might have applied to a larger
group. To take an example, a provision which denies to Indians the
capacity to make a promissory note is one which could be supported
under section 91(24),78 but it is one which Parliament could apply
as well to other persons in exercise of its Promissory Notes power.
In my view, such a provision is not inoperative under the Bill of
Rights. 79 A determination of the constitutional question is a
determination that Indians fall into a distinct class for the purposes
76. Hogg, supra, note 3 at 268
77. (1962), 40 W.W.R. 340; 39 C.R. 204 (Sask. D.C.)
78. Like section 43 of the IndianAct, it has to do with disposition of property
79. Thus, I do not agree with Professor Driedger, who suggests that Parliament
violates the Bill of Rights in legislation made specially applicable to Indians unless
Parliament has not the power to extend the legislation to non-Indians. E. A.
Driedger, The CanadianBill of Rights and the Lavell Case: A Possible Solution

(1973-74), 6 Ottawa L.R. 620 at 620-21
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of that kind of provision. If a restriction upon the capacity of Indians
to make a promissory note were not related to the characteristics
which give Indians a special place in the constitution, the enactment
could be supported only as a Promissory Notes law, and would be
inoperative. Thus, the Saskatchewan District Court ruled correctly
inR. v. Whiteman (No. 1)80 that section 96 of the IndianAct, which
makes it an offence to be intoxicated on a reserve, is not rendered
inoperative by the Bill of Rights because it is constitutionally valid
under section 91(24). It matters not that federal authority to make
intoxication an offence is limited neither to Indians nor to Indian
reserves. 81 A racial classification need not be essential to the
validity of the law under the British North America Act in order to
82
survive a Bill ofRights challenge.
The American equivalent of R v. Whiteman (No. 1) is Gray v.
United States, 83 a decision of the United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit, involving federal legislation, applicable on Indian
reservations, by which an Indian who rapes an Indian woman is
exempted from the possibility of the death penalty, while no
exemption is granted to a non-Indian who rapes an Indian woman or
to an Indian who rapes a non-Indian. Because of Congress' plenary
authority over all persons on Indian reserves, the special exemption
in favour of Indians did not in any sense reflect the limits of federal
power. However, the exemption was nonetheless proper legislation
under the Indian power, rather than the Indian reservation power,
because mitigation of penalty in favour of Indians is an obvious
expression of the wardship concept. In the result, the legislation was
84
upheld.
80. [197112 W.W.R. 316; 13 C.R.N.S. 178 (Sask. D.C.)
81. R. v. Whiteman (No. 1) (id.) may be said to be not directly on point because
section 96 is an exercise of the "Indian reserve" part of section 91(24). But just as
the Indian power will support special rules for Indians, the Indian reserve power
will support special rules -[the practical effect of which] is to discriminate against
Indians who, with rare exceptions, are the only persons living on reserves". Id. at
317; 13 C.R.N.S. at 179. If, as Sanders suggests, supra, note 46 at 412, the basis
of jurisdiction for the liquor sections dealing with activity on reserves is power over
reserves, not power over Indians, then Whiteman (No. 1)is distinguishable from
Antelope v. United States (1975), 523 F. 2d 400 (U.S.C.A., 9th Circ.) and Big
Crow v. UnitedStates (1975), 423 F. 2d 955 (U.S.C.A., 8th Circ.) and is correctly
decided because section 96 applies to' 'persons".
82. Contra Hogg, supra, note 3 at 268 and Kerr, supra, note 3 at 363 n.22:
"Discrimination may be valid under the Bill of Rights where it is a necessary
incident of the exercise of federal power, but invalid where it is not."
83. (1967), 394 F. 2d 96 (U.S.C.A., 9th Circ.)
84. It should be noted that the decision of the Court may have been based as much
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Of a different sort altogether is the illustrative provision posed by
Laskin C.J.C. in his dissenting judgment in Canard: "a provision in
federal railway legislation prohibiting Indians alone from travelling
in first class accommodation". 85 If, as the Chief Justice implies, the
86 it
provision is railway legislation and not Indian legislation,
denies equality before the law in the same way as the Drybones
provision. It is not enough that the class afforded special treatment
is recognized as distinctive by the constitution; the particular
treatment must be related to the distinctive characteristics, as it is
not if characterized constitutionally as railway rather than Indian
law. Indians are recognized as distinct constitutionally only for the
purpose of legislation which is supportable under the Indian
power.

87

Precisely the kind of legislation instanced by the Chief Justice
came before the United States Courts of Appeals in the Antelope88
and Big Crow89 cases cited earlier. Here, provisions of the Major
Crimes Act placed Indians at a disadvantage relative to non-Indians
in respect of crimes committed on Indian reservations. The
government argued that no complaint could be made of
discrimination which is a consequence of the federal Indian power.
The Court answered in each case that when Indians are put at a
serious racially-based disadvantage, the discriminatory treatment
cannot be justified by the wardship concept of the federal Indian
power. Still, Congress had full power to enact criminal legislation
limited in application to Indian reservations and other federal
territories. Congress had singled out Indians for special treatment,
not under the Indian power, but under powers embracing Indians
and others. What result? The provisions were held to deny equal
protection and struck down on the basis of the due process clause.
Because the legislation was not Indian law, Indians and others were
situated similarly with respect to it. Said the Ninth Circuit in
on the legislation's benefit to those who attacked it as on the principles here
considered.
85. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 at 179; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548 at 553; 4 N.R. 91 at 125;

[1975]3 W.W.R. I at5

86. Not because it deals with the conduct of Indians off a reserve, but because it is
hardly a fulfilment of any trust obligation to aborigines
87. Contra Hogg, supra, note 3 at 271, where he argues that a law which employs
a classification used by the BNA Act to confer jurisdiction need not meet the test of
equality.
88. (1975), 523 F. 2d 400 (U.S.C.A., 9th Circ.)
89. (1975), 523 F. 2d 955 (U.S.C.A., 8th Circ.)
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Antelope:
• . .Indians' rights to due process and equal protection under the
Fifth Amendment require that they not be treated worse than
similarly situated non-Indians. 9 0
The Eighth Circuit in Big Crow said simply that special treatment
which is not "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique
obligation toward the Indians" 9 1 cannot be sustained in the face of
the requirement of equal protection. Antelope is now on appeal to
the Supreme Court, certiorarihaving been granted on February 23,
1976.92 If the decision is upheld, as I think it should be, there will
be complete harmony in the Canadian and American jurisprudence.
It cannot escape notice that, for Bill ofRights purposes, the courts
must engage in an exercise of constitutional characterization which
is unnecessary for constitutional purposes; they must isolate the
particular head of power in section 91 to which an enactment is
attributable. 93 The exercise is not contrary to the spirit of the
constitution, however. Professor Abel has demonstrated that the
individual classes of subjects in section 91 do not overlap; what is
authorized by one is not authorized by any other. 94 Indian
legislation, for example, is not the same as any other kind of
legislation within section 91. 95 There is support for Professor
Abel's position in Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons96 , where the
Privy Council denied to section 91(2) a meaning which would
embrace the contents of other sub-sections of section 91, and in the
Local Prohibition case 97 , where the same Court suggested that a
provincial enactment authorized by one or the other of two classes
of subjects in section 92 could not logically be held to fall within
both.
90. (1975), 523 F. 2d 400 at 406
91. (1975), 523 F. 2d 955 at 959, quoting from Morton v. Mancari (1974), 417

U.S. 535 at 555
92. (1976), 96S. Ct. 100
93. "Which among the enacting government's specifics validates legislation is of
little practical moment." Abel, supra, note 24 at 511
94. Id. at 508ff.
95. Though under the aspect doctrine, which, says Abel, applies logically within
section 9 1, similar or identical measures may flow from distinct powers. This is the
American expression of the rule, which is preferred by Dr. Alexander Smith, The
Commerce Power in Canadaand the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1963)
at 37-38
96. (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.) (Can.)
97. Attorney-Generalof Ontariov. Attorney-Generalof Canada, [ 1896] A.C. 348
(P.C.) (Can.)
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IV. Lavell
Awareness of the decision in Re Eskimos 9 8 leaves a nagging doubt
about one aspect of the decision in Canard. The meaning of the
word "Indians" in section 91(24) is wider than the definition by
Parliament of the term in the Indian Act. Is it not one thing to say
that Parliament may limit the testamentary rights of the persons
described in section 91(24) and another to permit special restrictions
for certain only of those persons? The class of persons recognized as
constitutionally distinct is broader than the class to which the
legislation applies. Though not expressed in those terms, this was
essentially the argument raised and rejected in Attorney-General of
Canada v. Lavell9 9 challenging the validity of section 12(1) (b) of
the Indian Act, which denies Indian status to a woman who marries
a non-Indian.
Professor Hogg, among others, 10 0 is severely critical of the
judgment on the basis that it justifies a difference in legislative
treatment of men and women in reliance upon Parliament's power
under section 91(24).101 In other words, the Court is said to have
disposed of an argument of discrimination by reason of sex as if the
classification were racial and therefore built into the BNA Act.
I think, however, that the approach of the Supreme Court of
Canada was correct, and consistent with a proper understanding of
the later Canarddecision. The issue to be determined is whether the
class of persons singled out for special legislative treatment is
rationally distinct for the purposes of that legislation. If it is, it
matters not what criteria are used to distinguish members of the
class. The point is simply that equality before the law does not
demand equal treatment of dissimilar cases. The Court was able to
say, quite properly I think, that the legislation was a valid exercise
of the power under section 91(24), notwithstanding that persons
who might have been included as "Indians" were excluded by the
particular legislative classification. 10 2 The persons included in the
98. [1939]S.C.R. 104; [1939]2D.L.R. 417
99. 1 do not consider here the independent basis for decision in Lavell which is
founded on Dicey's concept of equality before the law. It is worth noting, however,
that this alternative basis was not used in the more recent Canard case. Phillips,
supra, note 3 at 380, says that the failure to reaffirm that narrow concept of equality
before the law "seems to indicate a weakening of its hold on the Court".
100. See also Kerr, supra, note 3 at 366-68
101. Supra, note 3 at 272
102. This was the conclusion drawn by D. E. Sanders, supra, note 57 at 97, 105
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classification were constitutionally distinct. Having reached that
conclusion, it followed necessarily that the class was rationally
distinct; the constitutional determination compelled the conclusion
if the philosophy later adopted in Canardwas to be employed.
The entire point here is made clearly by Beetz J. in his Canard
opinion:
The British North America Act, 1867, under the authority of
which the Canadian Bill of Rights was enacted, by using the
word "Indians" in s. 91(24), creates a racial classification and
refers to a racial group for whom it contemplates the possibility
of a special treatment. It does not define the expression
"Indian". This Parliament can do within constitutional limits by
using criteria suited to this purpose but among which it would not
appear unreasonable to count marriage and filiation and,
unavoidably, inter-marriages, in the light of either Indian
customs and values which, apparently were not proven in Lavell,
or of legislative history of which the Court could and did take
cognizance. 10 3
There is no doubt that the provisions of the Indian Act treat men
and women differently. To that extent the Act exhibits "discrimination by reason of sex". Accordingly, it was a necessary part of the
majority decision in Lavell to hold that the existence of any of the
prohibited forms of discrimination referred to in the opening words
of section 1 of the Bill of Rights is not a sufficient condition of
invalidity; there must be a denial of one of those guaranteed rights
10 4
and freedoms which include the right to equality before the law.
Moreover, discrimination by reason of sex, or by reason of any
other characteristic, does not necessarily constitute a denial of
equality before the law. '0 5 In this interpretation of section 1, Ritchie
J. is supported, I think, both by the grammatical structure of
sections I and 2 and by the need to avoid any redundancy in the
operative effect of section 1.106
The challenge in Lavell was directed at an aspect of the Indian
103. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 at 207; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548 at 575; 4 N.R. 91 at 106-07;
[197513 W.W.R. I at 29-30
104. [1974] S.C.R. 1349 at 1363-64; 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 at493-94
105. Id.; 38 D.L.R. (3d) at 493-94
106. See Kelly, supra, note 3 at 157-60 and Tarnopolsky, supra, note 9 at 300,
developing the first point, and Lyon, supra, note 17 at 51-55, who agrees that
discrimination runs afoul of the Bill of Rights "only when it is one of the Bill's
section I human rights and fundamental freedoms that is being prejudiced" (at 68),
but who develops the interesting notion that an attack on legislation as
discriminatory need not involve the equality guarantee at all.
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Act which in American jurisprudence would be called "underinclusive" classification: "the classification does not include all
who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law". 10 7 Furthermore, the disposition of the challenge by our
Supreme Court is compatible with the tolerance by the American
judiciary of under-inclusive classifications for which there is some
"fair reason". 108 What is peculiar about this notion in the context
of the Indian Act is that the question of reasonableness is determined
before the Bill of Rights issue is reached. Legislation cannot be
sustained under section 91 (24) unless the exclusion of persons who
qualify as "Indians" is seen to reflect some legitimate constraint
upon the development of Indian policy or to express some valid
federal objective in relation thereto. Ritchie J. was able to justify the
exclusion of women of Indian birth who marry non-Indians simply
by isolating the essential purpose of the classification, which was
"to specify how and by whom Crown lands reserved for Indians are
to be used". 10 9 The exclusion for that purpose was reasonable, and
the legislation could accordingly be held an exercise of the power
under section 91(24).
Indeed, it is more appropriate to say, given the narrow purpose of
the law, that it was not under-inclusive at all. A classification is not
under-inclusive if it includes all persons who are similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law: to narrow the purpose is to
narrow the range of persons who are similarly situated. 110 The
Supreme Court has said in effect that not all persons of Indian birth
are similarly situated with respect to a law which makes provision
for the use and enjoyment of lands reserved for the Indians. Such a
law may therefore exclude certain persons of Indian birth without
losing its status as Indian legislation. If it does, it is not truly
under-inclusive.
The Indian power of Congress, like that of Parliament, will
support legislation that does not apply to all who are Indians by
birth. It is for Congress to judge whether, to what extent, and for
how long any of such persons shall be recognized as requiring the
protection of the United States."' Furthermore, due process does
not require any more extended legislative application than is
107. Tussman and ten Broek, supra, note 4 at 344
108. Id. at 348, 349. See also Note, supra, note 13 at 1084ff.
109. [ 1974] S.C.R. 1349 at 1372; 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 at 500

110. Tussman and ten Broek, supra, note 4 at 348-351
111. See U.S. v. Sandoval (1913), 231 U.S. 28; Bowker, supra, note 28
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supportable under the Indian power. Indeed, apparent underinclusiveness in American Indian legislation has worked in its
favour. In Morton v. Mancari,1 12 non-Indian appellees argued that
a racial classification was involved in the employment preference
given by the Indian Reorganization Act" 3 to those members of
federally-recognized tribes with one-fourth or more degree Indian
blood. Racial classifications are said to be "suspect", and there is
an exceptionally heavy burden of justification imposed on the
government.' 14 However, the Supreme Court denied that any racial
classification was involved in the employment preference.
The preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting
of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federallyrecognized' tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals
who are racially to be classified as 'Indians.' In this sense, the
preference is political rather than racial in nature. ' 5
As a result, the court had only to find a rational basis for the
1 6
classification; it did not have to find a compelling justification.
Of course, the rational basis is found in Congress' unique obligation
toward the Indians.
V. Conclusion
It remains only to observe in conclusion that the consternation over
the decision in Lavell is attributable directly to what I consider a
fundamental misapprehension of the principle later applied in
Canard and a failure to see what was necessarily involved in
Drybones. Section 91(24) does not override the equality guarantee;
rather it provides a basis for recognition of a distinct class of persons
appropriate for special treatment, acknowledging that the equality
guarantee requires only that like cases be treated alike. What is
perhaps more incredible than the general failure to understand what
was done in the trilogy under discussion, is that, in the course of the
criticism directed at our Supreme Court, there has been a call for
7
adoption of the American doctrine of reasonable classification. "

112. (1974), 41 U.S. 535
113. (1934), 25 U.S.C. #461
114. Note, supra, note 13 at 1088
115. (1974), 417 U.S. 535 at 553 n. 24
116. See United States v. Big Crow (1975), 523 F. 2d 955 at 960
117. See Hogg, supra, note 3 at 279; Tarnopolsky, supra, note 3, 7 Ottawa L.R.
at 22-23 and supra, note 9 at 302-304; Kelly, supra, note 3
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In truth, the application of that doctrine to the Indian legislation of
Congress has produced decisions adhering to the very same
principles as have been applied by our Court. 118
118. Professor Elliott does recognize that Martland J. in Canard proposed a test
that is the essential equivalent of the American doctrine of reasonable
classification. Supra, note 3 at 321 n. 35

